

diffused, to communicate, not in the form of effusions—whence the word “infusion”—but of transmission, oral or written, through a veil of symbols and in anonymity or at least with a concern to recreate and rediscover rather than to seek originality at any price. Humility, therefore, but intellectual and not sentimental. Love, as well, but which to find or preserve its strength keeps from being sentimental and is not merely desire or sensuous attraction. Desire for infinity? More likely, as Frithjof Schuon emphasized, the logical and ontological tendency of this love toward its own transcendental essence.

Gnosis calls forth the mystical, just as anything mystical always contains some gnosis. Mysticism, more nocturnal, would willingly cultivate renunciation; gnosis, more solar, would observe detachment and would practice systematization, although the mystic occasionally finds in his own path the same intermediary entities as the gnostic does. But while the gnostic first seeks illuminating and salvific knowledge, the mystic limits the number of intermediaries as much as he can and aspires above all to unite with his God—a union that, in the three Abrahamic religions maintains the ontological separation between God and Man. To esotericism thus understood are attached procedures or rituals that aim at eliciting the concrete manifestation of particular entities. Such is theurgy.

The esoteric attitude in the sense of “gnostic” is thus a mystical experience in which intelligence and memory participate, both being expressed in a symbolic form that reflects diverse levels of reality. Gnosis, according to a remark by theosopher Valentin Tomberg, would be the expression of a form of intelligence and memory that had effected a passage through a mystical experience. A gnostic would therefore be a mystic capable of communicating to someone else his own experiences in a manner that would retain the impression of revelations received in passing through the different levels of the “mirror.” An example of a mystic proposition would be “God is love; he who dwells in love dwells in God and God in him;” or “my Father and I are one.” An example of a first-level gnostic proposition would be “God is a Trinity: Father, Son, and Holy Ghost” or “In my Father’s house there are many mansions.”

B) Theosophy

Theosophy is a gnosis that has a bearing not only on the salvific relations the individual maintains with the divine world, but also on the nature of God Himself, or of divine persons, and on the natural universe, the origin of that universe, the hidden structures that constitute it in its actual state, its relationship to mankind, and its final ends. It is in this general sense that we speak of theosophy traditionally. Theosophy, in the sense we are using it, confers on esotericism this cosmic, or rather cosmosophic dimension, thereby introducing the idea of an intentionality in the world, that keeps esotericism from suc-

cumbing to solipsism. Theosophy opens esotericism to the entire universe and by the same token renders possible a philosophy of nature.

"*Theosophia*" etymologically is "wisdom of God." The word is used by several Church Fathers, both Greek and Latin, as a synonym for "theology," quite naturally since "*sophia*" means at once knowledge, doctrine, and wisdom. The *sophos* is a "wiseman." The "*theosophoi*" are "those knowing divine things," and that, however, does not necessarily mean theologians! It would be interesting to systematically trace the use of this word by religious authors from the beginning of Christianity until the Renaissance. We would see that it occasionally differs from the sense of its synonym "theology" such as we understand it today. Theosophy is distinguished from theology to suggest more or less the existence of knowledge of a gnostic type. It is in this sense, for example, that Pseudo-Dionysus tends to use it in the sixth century, as well as, though somewhat less clearly in the thirteenth century the author of the astonishing *Summa Philosophiae*, who is perhaps not Robert Grosseteste, but who in any case, came from the same milieu as he did: theosophers are only authors inspired by the holy books, and theologians (like Pseudo-Dionysus or Origen) are those who have the task of explaining theosophy. We see that the terms are the opposite of the present-day meaning. We must wait until the Renaissance for more frequent usage but it is still synonymous, sometimes, with theology or philosophy. Johannes Reuchlin, who at the beginning of the sixteenth century did much to promote the Christian Kabbalah, speaks of "*theosophistae*" to designate decadent scholastics as does Cornelius Agrippa when both could have used the label in its present meaning. Du Cange instructs on the use, at the time, of "theosophy" for "theology" (*Glossarium ad scriptores mediae et infimae latinitatis*, 1733/1736). From 1540 to 1553, Johannes Arboreus (Alabri) published a *Theosophia* in several volumes, but hardly touches on esotericism.

The meaning of the word becomes clearly defined at the end of the sixteenth century, probably under the influence of the *Arbatel*, a book of white magic that appeared undated, but around 1550 or 1560, followed by numerous reprintings. Here, theosophy has already almost its present meaning. It begins to be used in this esoteric meaning by Henrich Khunrath at the very end of the sixteenth century. Boehme's theosophy always starts with Nature, which he conceives as essentially celestial and divine. Contemporary also is the title under which Valentin Weigel's *Libellus Theosophiae* (*Ein Büchlein der göttlichen Weisheit*) first appeared at Neustadt in 1618. This is not the author's title—he died thirty years earlier—but it is the one used for publication. We see from these examples that the meaning of the word becomes more precise at the same time that the notion receives its definitive elaboration in Germany from several contemporaneous authors, and its features are subsequently retained. This moment when theosophy acquires its patent of nobility corresponds to the apogee of German baroque literature as well as to the birth of

the "Rosicrucian" movement (ca. 1610–1620). Henceforth the word will be used often, e.g., by Johann Georg Gichtel and Gottfried Arnold. It is already accompanied by a kindred term, fashionable with Rosicrucians and Paracelsians, first used by the Platonic and Hermetist philosopher Francesco Patrizi: "Pansophy." This term combines two notions of theosophy, Wisdom by divine illumination and Light from Nature. In 1596, Bartholomäus Scleus opposed particularist or sectarian theologians with his *"Mystica Theologia Universalis und Pansophia,"* which for him was the same as *"Magia coelestis"* or celestial magic. It is more customary to mean by "Pansophy," as it was defined a little later by Jan Amos Comenius, a system of universal knowledge, all things being ordered and classified by God according to analogical relationships. Or, if you prefer, a knowledge of divine things acquired via the concrete world, i.e., the entire universe, in which the "signatures" or hieroglyphics must first be deciphered. In other words, the Book of Nature helps us understand better Holy Scripture and God Himself. This would reserve the term theosophy for the reverse procedure, knowing the universe thanks to our knowledge of God. But, practically speaking, especially from the eighteenth century onward, "theosophy" is generally used to designate the Pansophic progression as well.

In the eighteenth century, the word and concept "theosophy" enter the philosophical vocabulary and become widespread. The two most important theosophical works at the beginning of the century are also German. They have wide-ranging repercussions, and their titles are explicit: *Theophilosophia theoretica et practica* (1710) by Sincerus Renatus and *Opus mago-cabalisticum et theosophicum* (1721) by George von Welling. It is in this sense once more that Franciscus Buddeus uses the word in his *Isagoge* (Leipzig, 1727). But especially pastor Jacob Brucker devotes a long chapter to theosophy in his *Kurze Fragen aus der Philosophischen Historie* (Ulm, 1735) in German, followed by his monumental *Historia critica Philosophiae* in Latin (Leipzig, 1741). All theosophers are represented there. We have the impression that he has left out none. It is the official consecration in the world of letters, so much so that Brucker will remain through the Enlightenment the obligatory reference in the history of philosophy. Few authors, even among the esotericists, will have contributed as much as he to promote theosophy, which he himself did not find congenial!

At the same time, the word is missing from most of the major French dictionaries during the Enlightenment. We do not find it in Furetière, nor in either the *Dictionnaire de l'Académie* or Bayle's *Dictionnaire*. In Trévoux' dictionary there is a brief, though inoffensive, mention. But Denis Diderot, makes up for lost time. In a long article in his great *Encyclopaedia*, entitled "Theosophers," which he himself wrote, he repeats entire passages of Brucker's texts in French without citing his source, while committing some misinterpretations, which free translation does not altogether excuse. His

French is indeed more elegant and charming than the cumbersome Latin of its model, but the content is superficial also. Diderot meanwhile wavers between sympathy and disdain. At any rate, despite an attraction for the representatives of this form of esotericism, he himself does not have a theosophical cast of mind. At any rate he contributed to spread the use of the word in France. It will continue to be used occasionally in other senses. For example, Kant calls "theosophism" the system of philosophers who like Malbranche believe they can see everything in God, and Antonio Rosmini uses "theosophy" to designate the general metaphysics of being (in *Teosofia*, 1859). But even with somewhat vague connotations, it is almost always the esoteric sense that prevails from then on. Thus, Friedrich Schiller titles one of his first texts *Theosophie des Julius*, which appeared in *Thalia* in 1787. Some confusion is introduced in 1875 when Madame Blavatsky founds the "Theosophical Society," which took its highly syncretist teachings chiefly from the East.*

By "theosophy" as by "esotericism," we mean then first a hermeneutic, i.e., an interpretation of divine instruction, e.g., from a revealed Book, founded both on an intellectual and speculative operation and upon a revelation caused by an illumination. (The mode of thought here is analogic and homologic, with both the human being and the universe considered as symbols of God.) In the case of theosophy, properly speaking, this interpretation of divine teaching has bearing on the inner mysteries of the Divinity itself (theosophy *strictu sensu*) or of the entire universe (theosophy *lato sensu*, as used here).

The theosopher starts with a revealed given, his myth—for example, the narrative of Creation in the Book of Genesis—from which he evokes symbolic resonances by virtue of his active imagination. Understood as a way of individual salvation, gnosis implied already an idea of "penetration." But this time that means going down not only into the depths of self. This catabasis or anabasis is presumed to be effected also in the depths of Nature and of the divine itself. Nature aspires to a deliverance the key to which is held by Man. Since the Alexandrian *Corpus Hermeticum*, Western esotericism has tended to hold the principle of the divine origin of the human *mens*, which makes it contain also the organization of the universe. Our *mens* has a nature identical to that of the stellar governors of the universe described in the *Poimandres*. Therefore it is identical to that of the reflections and projections of those in the more concrete world that surrounds us. And the Deity that "rests in itself" as Boehme says, i.e., dwelling in its absolute transcendence, at the same time

* On the history of the word *theosophy*, and of the movement of that name, see my article "Le courant théosophique (fin XVI^e–XVII^e siècles): essai de périodisation", in *Politica Hermetica*, nr. VI, 1993 (Lausanne: L'Age d'Homme), pp. 6–41. Forthcoming translation in *Theosophical History* (journal published by the California State University, Fullerton).

comes from itself. God is a hidden treasure who aspires to be known. He lets himself be partially revealed by halving himself at the heart of an ontological sphere, situated between our created world and the unknowable which is allegedly the place of encounter between Him and the creature. Thus transcendence and immanence are reconciled.

“Imagination and mediation”: this category of esotericism, cited earlier, represents an essential aspect of theosophy. Indeed, no more so in the Abrahamic theosophies than in the others, truth is not manifested in abstract ideas but takes on visible forms and envelopes. In itself Divinity is immutable, and yet it makes itself manifest. There is the paradox! We know Divinity but only by living images of its manifestation. The infinite is “fixed” in limits. (“*Der Urgrund fasst sich im Grund,*” says Boehme.) But the creature losing itself through dedication to the infinite, going beyond limits to the infinite, means going to an evil infinite, as happened to Lucifer.

Let us cite Boehme once more for he is characteristic of this form, this current of thought, while at the same time he is a model, at least in a poetic mode, for modern theosophy. He tells us that Nature is one of the specific modes of Revelation. By starting from our most concrete nature in order to raise ourselves to the science of higher Nature, we practice a gnosis that is specifically theosophic because this gnosis is not only abstract knowledge but is accompanied by a transformation of ourself. Earlier we recalled that theosophic discourses are partially tributaries of the cultural milieus in which they flourish. This is something we must keep in mind whenever we study such a discourse. Thus, Boehme’s theosophy is an amalgam between the medieval mystical tradition (that of fourteenth-century Germany) and the *Naturphilosophie* inspired by Paracelsus. What Boehme retains from German mysticism, in a properly theosophic turn of mind, is the theme of the second birth, which for him is equivalent to the alchemists’ *Great Work*. It is the birth of the Christ in Man through the Holy Spirit and the Father. But with Boehme a philosophy of Nature serves to materialize in some respect that notion of the second birth through meditation on symbols to achieve the “fixing” of Holy Spirit in the body of light. We see the relationship to mysticism. However, the theosopher does not limit himself to describing the itinerary he has followed through torments and joys, as does, for example, St. John of the Cross. The theosopher starts with a personal event, which he subsequently objectifies in his own way, projecting it backwards on a macrocosmic soul in the image of celestial totality, and practices thus a form of exemplariness in reverse. The difference with mysticism appears especially, of course, in the fact that the contemplative claims to abolish images, while for Boehme and theosophers generally, the image is, on the contrary, the fulfillment.

In this respect we could call theosophy a theology of Revelation, if we realize that this Revelation is that of God in the interior of a creature at the same time it is the Revelation of God to Himself. Theosophy would thus be,

at least in this cultural context a theology of the image, since the latter, far from being a simple reflection, truly represents the ultimate reality to the extent that the finality of each being is to produce its image, which in the last analysis is the best of itself. In realizing our perfection, or rather our integrality, we incarnate ourselves. Each being possesses a finality of perfection, which passes through the image and its incarnation. (In the seventeenth century, *Bild* still signified both "image" and "body.") Thus the letter of Holy Scripture is the very body in which God is manifest and, consequently, Christian theosophers are almost all "*bibelfest*": they want to be "scriptuary" like the Jewish Kabbalists.

We understand better the success of theosophy and pansophy in the intellectual and spiritual climate of the late Renaissance, if we juxtapose it with the need, found in so many men in the seventeenth century, to seek the explanation of the structure of the universe and its cohesion. Both theological and scientific thought tried to define the relationship of the microcosm and the macrocosm, i.e., of Man and the world, and to integrate everything in a general harmony according to perspective of synthesis truly able to favor a solidarity of spirit. This is why pansophy, total science, as its name indicates, appears as a branch of theosophy, indeed, as its synonym. On the other hand, the Reformation included, undoubtedly in embryo, if not theosophic elements, never discernable in the thought of its founders—at least a disposition to encourage its presence by virtue of an original or constitutive mixture of the mysticism and rationalism in Protestantism. Moreover, the recommended reading of Scripture, enlightened by the Holy Spirit, could only favor bold and individual speculations, especially arising at the moment men began to see in their Lutheranism more a moralizing catechism than a teaching for life.

Behind the complexity of the real, the theosopher seeks the hidden meanings of the ciphers and hieroglyphics of Nature. A quest inseparable from an intuitive plunge into the myth to which he belongs through faith, where his active imagination sends forth resonances appropriate for being gathered into a bouquet of meanings. At the same time that he starts from a reflection on things in order to understand God, so he tries to seize the becoming of the divine world—his question is not "*an sit Deus*," but "*quid sit Deus*"—in order to understand the world at the same time and to possess thereby the intimate vision of the principle of the reality of the universe and its becoming. The aspects of myth he emphasizes are quite naturally those that the established churches have tended to neglect or ignore: the nature of the fall of Lucifer and of Adam, androgyny, sophiology, arithmosophy. . . . He believes in a permanent revelation directed to him, and his discourse always gives the impression that he receives knowledge and inspiration simultaneously. He inserts each concrete observation into an integral system that is not the least totalitarian but is indefinitely open, always based on the triptych of

origin, present state, and ultimate ends, i.e., his system is based on a cosmogony (bound to a theogony and an anthropogony), a cosmology, and an eschatology. St. Paul himself would have justified in advance this active and operative quest, affirming that “the Spirit searches everything, even the depths of God” (I Cor. 2:10). The theosopher, like the gnostic generally, accompanies the acquisition of deep insight with a change in being, a felicitously inevitable process as soon as he *plays the part* in theogonic and cosmic dramas or seeks, like Boehme, to achieve a “second birth.” His discourse, akin to a recital or recitative, gives the impression of being less his work than that of a spirit speaking through him. It is only in his choice of images, in the form of his discourse, that we can discover each time his own originality. Moreover the essential for him is not so much to invent or to be original, as to remember, or to devote his energy to rediscovering the living articulation of all things visible and invisible, by scrutinizing both the Divine and observed Nature often in its most infinitesimal details, and becoming the hermeneut of theosophers who have scrutinized these details before him.

In the archaic epoch of Greece, *mythos* and *logos*—which together make up mythology—did not contradict each other but called forth a sacred narrative of gods and heroes. Little by little, *logos* took precedence over *mythos*, philosophy over mythology, to the detriment of metonymy and meaningful displacements of sense. Recent contemporary hermeneutics has at least recovered the plurality of meaning, but though “plural,” it does not have the same ends as the theosophic project. By nature the latter avoids impasses because, instead of juxtaposing the translations of the senses, theosophy practices advancing a discourse that does not pretend to speak about anything other than itself. The revealed narrative of myth, on which it rests is there to be relived, under penalty of dissipating in abstract notions. Thus theosophy has often, albeit tacitly, supported theology, revitalizing it when it risked sinking into the conceptual. The conceptual, for Boehme, Oetinger, Baader, and other theosophers, always waits for its reinterpretation in and through a *mythos-logos* wherein the concept, bereft of its privileged status, retains at best the status of a provisional, methodological tool. Because, much more than recourse to abstraction, it is the experience of the symbol that assures the grasp of the mythic experience. Any myth to the extent it is complete, i.e., consists of the triptych mentioned earlier, is presented by the same stroke as a narrative of origins. It reports on events happening *in illo tempore*, as Mircea Eliade has so pertinently noted, which establish ritual acts and theosophic discourses.

The theosopher exploits thoroughly the exploratory range of the mythic narrative in unveiling the infinite richness of its symbolic function—the “natural tableau of relationships uniting God, Man and the universe,” as expressed in the title of a splendid work (1782) of Louis-Claude de Saint-Martin. This richness gives us the means to live in our world as in a Baudelairean “forest of

symbols.” Symbols, not allegories, because it is not a matter of extracting from the images clothing the revealed narrative a sense other than the narrative itself and that could be expressed—or reduced—by another kind of discourse. Permanent renewal in the latent sense of the Book, a sense that the Book only allows us to approach with the help of the Spirit, theosophy ties together the origin and the end, i.e., the theogony, indeed the anthropogony, and the eschatology. But, of course, a “complete” theosophy adds to these dimensions that of cosmology or, rather cosmosophy, endless reflection on the different material and natural levels, a gnosis perpetually nourished by the discovery and explanation of analogies. Thus, human existence is apprehended as a totality wherein our life finds its East and its Meaning.

Comparable in this to prophesy, although by different modes, theosophy is an “*ex-plicatio*” of Revelation. Christianity especially lends itself to such an “amplification.” Does not the Gospel of Luke (1:1–13) begin with these words: “Inasmuch as many have undertaken to compile a narrative of the things which have been accomplished among us just as they were delivered to us by those who from the beginning were eyewitnesses of the Word . . .” In Judaic tradition, the function of *midrash* is to actualize Revelation by interpreting it as a function of the present. Christianity keeps, as a need inherent in its basic nature, this necessity of a continuous Revelation because, although definitive for the essential (Heb. 10:12–14), it remains necessarily veiled in part, apophatic. On the theophany of Jesus, Origen and Gregory of Nyssa explain that His glory was made manifest in the mist. This means that Revelation remains until the last day, the object of prophetic elucidation, theosophy raising the value of the mist itself. In both cases entering into an increasingly profound understanding of the “mystery” is neither an insoluble enigma nor problem but a message proposed, support for endless meditation.

We could say that two forms of theology exist. First of all, teaching by various denominational churches of what revealed Truth is. But there is also another form of theology that corresponds to the attempt to acquire knowledge (*gnosis*) of the immense domain of reality deep within which occurs the working of salvation. A knowledge that bears on the structure of the physical and spiritual worlds, on the forces operative within time, the relationships among these forces, both micro- and macrocosmic, the history of their transformations, the relation between God, humanity, and the universe; a domain which in itself deserves exploration for the glory of God and the good of fellow men; an exploration that also responds to the demands of talents made fruitful (Mat. 25:14–30). In Christianity there have been theologians, like St. Bonaventure, who devoted themselves to a theosophic approach to Nature because deciphering the “signature of things” constitutes one of the two complementary directions of theology, the theosopher being a theologian of that Holy Scripture we call the universe.

We can distinguish with Valentin Tomberg, two modes of that theosophic approach based on the idea of universal correspondences. First of all there is a theosophy bearing on temporal relationships, what he calls a "mythological symbolism" where the mythological symbols express the correspondences among the archetypes in the past and their manifestation in time. For example, the nature of Adam's sin, the Fall of Adam and Eve, and their glorious original state are the object of a theosophic projection on the nature of man as such, the task he must accomplish, notably the redemptive work he must effect on Nature. A myth of this type is the expression of an "eternal idea" emerging from time and history. On the other hand, there is a theosophy bearing on space, the structure of space, and what Tomberg calls a "typological symbolism." The latter concerns essentially the central panel of the "complete" theosophic triptych mentioned earlier (theogony and cosmogony, cosmosophy, eschatology). This time we are dealing with symbols that link their prototypes on high to their manifestations down below. Ezekiel's vision, for example, expresses a typological symbolism that implies a universal cosmological revelation. The *Merkaba* or the mystic way of the Chariot, which comes out of the Jewish Kabbalah, is based entirely on that vision of Ezekiel. The author of the *Zohar* sees in the living creatures and wheels Ezekiel describes a complex of symbolic images interpretable as a key to cosmic knowledge. Of course, the two modes of approach (mythological symbolism and typological symbolism) usually coexist in the same discourse.

The revelations thus described evidently give the impression of "objectifying in a macrocosm what passes in the individual *psyche* out of touch with God." This is the reason, Pierre Deghaye recalls, that the German philosopher Ludwig Feuerbach reduced theosophy to the status of "esoteric psychology." Deghaye prefers to see, notably in Jacob Boehme whom he has studied especially, "a veritable psychology of depths," but without taking a stand on the objective reality of what Boehme's revelations purvey to us, i.e., without reducing these revelations to a single dimension that would be of a purely psychological order. To be sure, we have quickly detected in theosophers the alliance of desire and concept, so much so that mystics could find theosophy nourished on Nature speculations too scientific, and that those holding a purely objective rationality tend to consider Nature philosophers—in the Romantic sense of *Naturphilosophie*—too mystical, in any case like people whose discourse, at best, reveals nothing other than the movements at work in their unconscious. It seems that there would be more people today to take theosophy seriously because our epoch considers ever more seriously the possibility of a connaturality of our spirit and the universe. In other words, we do not exclude the possibility that some of our images reflect hidden structures of this universe and that the great founding myths correspond to them. . . . Thus it remains that the theosophic glance can be extraordinarily fecund, counterbalancing dualisms and ideologies of all kinds. Indeed, theosophy

does not pretend that we must go beyond Man in order to transform him into something else. Theosophy only reminds humanity of what our true powers were and tries to give them back to us. It teaches that nothing is gained, finally, in wanting to scale heaven in contempt of earth or in wanting to be satisfied with the descent of the gods without trying to visit Olympus with them: anabasis and catabasis, like Castor and Pollux, are inseparable and complementary. Thanks to theosophy also, the fragmented, splintered “multiverse” becomes the universe once more, a world bearing meaning and composed of living pluralities.

C) Secrecy

Are all esotericisms necessarily bound to the notion of secrecy? Do they contain elements that must not be disclosed in contrast with exotericisms whose discourse is meant for the public forum? Let us be careful not to reduce esotericism, to *disciplina arcani*, as we have seen might happen. Limiting esotericism to that single dimension proceeds often from bad faith, ignorance, or even intellectual sloth—it is less difficult to restrict one’s field to simple questions of vocabulary! Most of the time there is no desire for “secrecy” in the conventional sense of the term. A secret needs no one to protect it. In fact, we may speak of confidential teaching Jesus allegedly gave his disciples or of teaching kept jealously at the heart of initiatory societies. *Disciplina arcani* means chiefly this: the mysteries of religion, the ultimate nature of reality, hidden forces in the cosmic order, hieroglyphs of the visible world—none of which lends itself to literal understanding. Neither do such lend themselves to a univocal explanation but rather must be the object of progressive multi-levelled penetration.

In an essay published in 1906, Georg Simmel gave a statement on the sociology of secrecy, showing that even apart from esotericism, a secret is a component of the structure of social interaction. Thus secrecy does not seem to us a component of esotericism qua esotericism. A so-called “secret” society is not created in view of some kind of hocus-pocus, but—as Raymond Abellio has put it so well—to give a small group of people transparency because the world itself is globally opaque. And generally it is not a doctrine that the initiate is supposed to keep hidden, but at most the details of a ritual. Nevertheless, nearly all those of Freemasonry have been published for a long time and this is hardly considered as a breach of “Masonic secrecy”! If a Freemason or a member of any esoteric society whatsoever must conceal the name of his affiliated brothers, that is at most a measure of discretion. In the Hellenist religions, the situation was comparable. What an initiator was to keep to himself did not deal with an ineffable religious instruction, comprehensible to him alone anyway, but a ritual in its purely material aspect. Indeed, if we take the sacred seriously, we must always put up a slight partition, simply theoretical really, between the

